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Cybersecurity practitioners working in organisations implement
risk controls aiming to improve the security of their systems. De-
termining prioritisation of the deployment of controls and under-
standing their likely impact on overall cybersecurity posture is
challenging, yet without this understanding there is a risk of imple-
menting inefficient or even harmful security practices. There is a
critical need to comprehend the value of controls in reducing cyber-
risk exposure in various organisational contexts, and the factors
affecting their usage. Such information is important for research
into cybersecurity risk and defences, for supporting cybersecurity
decisions within organisations, and for external parties guiding cy-
bersecurity practice such as standards bodies and cyber-insurance
companies.
Cybersecurity practitioners possess a wealth of field knowledge
in this area, yet there has been little academic work collecting and
synthesising their views. In an attempt to highlights trends and
a range of wider organisational factors that impact on a control’s
effectiveness and deployment, we conduct a set of interviews ex-
ploring practitioners’ perceptions. We compare alignment with the
recommendations of security standards and requirements of cyber-
insurance policies to validate findings. Although still exploratory,
we believe this methodology would help in identifying points of
improvement in cybersecurity investment, describing specific po-
tential benefits.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→ Systems security;Network security;
Human and societal aspects of security and privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In order to mitigate the harms resulting from cyber-attacks, security
practitioners working in organisations seek to strengthen defences
and improve resilience, yet there is not necessarily a clear path to
achieving this. In 2019, organisations were purchasing an average
of three new cybersecurity products annually, mainly chosen to
address threat trends, despite 70% of organisations performing one
or fewer revisions of their cybersecurity posture in the same time
frame [6]. This suggests that most organisations spend little time
assessing their cybersecurity exposure; and for those that do, it is
difficult to make decisions on which controls to adopt, or to assess
whether different controls could provide better risk reduction.
There is a need to better understand the real value of risk con-
trols: for organisations looking to prioritise security deployments
and strengthen defences, and to support research in the area of
cybersecurity risk and defence. Insurance and audit are key dri-
vers of good cybersecurity practice, and a strong understanding
of the value of risk controls is also vital to supporting external
parties such as cyber-insurance providers, who insure businesses
against cyber-risk, in accurately assessing and making recommen-
dations for reducing cyber-risk [20]. There are numerous stan-
dards, such as the Center for Internet Security’s 20 Critical Se-
curity Controls (CIS CSCs) [11], NIST Cybersecurity Framework
(CSF) [21], ISO 27002 [1], and Cyber Essentials [5], aimed at facilitat-
ing information-security management by organisations. The value
of deploying controls and complying with standards is not easy to
quantify. Furthermore industry, for example cyber-insurers, increas-
ingly suggest products and approaches for reducing cyber-risk [19].
This can influence take-up, and it is important that such guidance
is supported by up-to-date evidence on control effectiveness.
A wealth of experiential knowledge is possessed by the cyberse-
curity practitioner community on the effectiveness of cybersecurity
controls, and on the frequency with which and ways in which
cybersecurity controls are deployed in organisations. The aim of
our research is to synthesise this knowledge by identifying and
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analysing the views of security practitioners on the impact of using
security controls on reducing the risk exposure of an organisation.
We also aim to explore the ways in which organisations actually
deploy risk controls, and investigate the factors that impact on
effectiveness and deployment.
Prior research has aimed to determine control effectiveness in
specific organisational contexts [15, 17, 18]. Technical approaches,
such as automated modelling of risk-control properties and opti-
misation methods, have been applied to reasoning about control
effectiveness [2, 3, 8, 9]. Some qualitative studies have provided
insights into the value of a limited number of specific types of con-
trol and some of the factors that are important in their deployment.
The work of Such et al. [24] explores the views of industry stake-
holders on the characteristics of 20 assurance techniques, such as
vulnerability scans, red-team exercises, and configuration review.
A survey was conducted to review them in terms of cost, effective-
ness, personnel, experience and time required, and to determine the
three most complementary controls. This information is then used
to provide a cost-effectiveness measure, and the sets of controls
that are more effective and more cost-effective. Similarly, Dietrich
et al. [7] explored the opinions of system operators on system mis-
configuration. They conducted interviews and a survey, aiming
at determining human elements (causes) of misconfiguration, and
provide recommendations to reduce their frequency and impact.
None of this prior work fully achieves our aim of understanding
practitioners’ perspectives of the relative effectiveness of security
controls in reducing the risk exposure of an organisation. Further-
more, this work does not provide a comprehensive account of the
ways in which organisations deploy risk controls. In this paper we
aim to progress understanding of these topics by identifying prac-
titioners’ perceptions of the effectiveness of various risk-control
setups and gathering their experiences of the ways risk controls are
currently being deployed by organisations. We explore two main
research questions (RQs):
RQ1 How effective do security practitioners perceive differ-
ent cybersecurity controls to be in addressing organi-
sational cyber-risk? There is a need to comprehend the
real impact of security controls on the risk run by organisa-
tions of being harmed by cyber-attacks; in particular, to
understand how the controls deployed, and the ways in
which these controls are positioned and configured, mitigate
cyber-attacks on networks and their assets, and/or reduce
the harms that may ensue. We aim to collect the perceptions
of security practitioners on this question.
RQ2 How are different cybersecurity controls deployed in
practical environments? Identifying how organisations
deploy controls, the challenges faced in doing so, and the
factors deployment depends on, benefits the development of
improved practical risk-control approaches. It could also aid
estimation of which controls an organisation with particular
characteristics is likely to have deployed. This reduces the
organisation-specific data required in the estimation of cyber-
risk, improving the ability to obtain accurate results from
sparse data. This benefits both research into thewider picture
of the cyber-risk landscape, and into the risk assessment
of individual organisations, as the data gathered directly
from organisations on the controls they use and the way in
which they are configured may be incomplete or difficult to
obtain [27].
We examined these research questions by soliciting the per-
spectives of security practitioners through an online survey and
interviews. While the question of control effectiveness is clearly
complex and, like the deployment of controls, will vary between
organisational contexts, we aimed to ascertain whether any consen-
sus could be reached, and also to establish a stronger understanding
of these concepts: the factors that contribute to them, and the ways
in which they can be reasoned about, measured and studied.
In this article we present the studies and reflect critically on the
findings, providing recommendations for furthering knowledge.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We present the qualitative perspectives of security practi-
tioners on the effectiveness of controls and the deployment
of controls by organisations.
• We identify trends in the effectiveness and deployment of
controls according to the practitioner community and present
these findings in the context of organisational risk.
• We highlight the factors that impact on the effectiveness of
the risk controls used by organisations, and that drive their
deployment.
Our methodology is presented in Section 2, and the quantitative
and qualitative results in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. We discuss
the implications in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6.
2 METHODOLOGY
We conducted two studies seeking to elicit the perspectives of
security practitioners on our research questions:
(1) Online survey.We aimed to obtain a quantitative account
of security practitioners’ perceptions of the relative effec-
tiveness of the CIS 20 CSCs (v7), and of the frequency with
which organisations deploy these controls. This standard
was chosen since it is widely recognised and used [10, 22],
with clearly defined categories suitable for the survey. The
online survey was completed by 30 participants between
June and August 2019.
(2) Semi-structured interview. Interviews were conducted to
gather qualitative evidence of the views of security prac-
titioners on our research questions. The aim was to delve
deeper into perceptions of control effectiveness and the chal-
lenges of deployment that had been possible in the survey,
through open-ended questions [12]. Seven security practi-
tioners participated in interviews, three of whomhadworked
in cybersecurity at a senior level within one or more or-
ganisations, and four of whom had experience working as
penetration testers.
2.1 Recruitment
We recruited participants by emailing our existing contacts in or-
ganisations that employ security practitioners. The researchers
advertised the survey on their LinkedIn pages, targeting security-
practitioner contacts, and on relevant mailing lists. We also at-
tended events for executive-level security-practitioner groups to
Practitioners’ Views on Cybersecurity Control Adoption and Effectiveness ARES 2021, August 17–20, 2021, Vienna, Austria
promote the studies. By recruiting through this range of channels,
through each of which a range of different security practitioners
were reached, we aimed to reduce any possibilities of bias in our
participant selection. Our anonymisation of the online-survey data
prevents us from determining the overlap between participants in
the survey and the interviews. Ethical approval for the studies was
granted by our Research Ethics Committee.
2.2 Online survey
Participants’ demographic data was collected, including job role,
years of experience in that role, and years of experience in cyberse-
curity. Participants were then asked to record their views on the
effectiveness of each of the CIS 20 CSCs in securing the networks
of organisations by:
• Rating the effectiveness (in their opinion) of each control
using a five-point Likert scale with response categories very
ineffective, ineffective, neutral, effective, very effective (or don’t
know).
• Selecting up to three most effective and three least effective
controls using drag-and-drop to the relevant boxes.
Participants were also asked how commonly each of these 20
controls is implemented by organisations by:
• Rating the frequency of deployment of each control using
a five-point Likert scale with response categories: almost
never, rarely, neutral, often, almost always (or don’t know).
Finally, participants were offered the opportunity to record any
additional comments at the end of the survey. This allowed partici-
pants to add additional information they considered relevant, such
as more detailed perceptions on the control-effectiveness concept,
or further insights into the factors that drive the deployment of
controls by organisations.
The controls were listed in a randomised order to each partici-
pant, with the aim of reducing the likelihood of biasing responses
through the consistent placement of these elements in the same
area and, in particular, next to the same most and least ranking
boxes. We ran a pilot of the survey with three people with relevant
experience: two had worked as penetration testers, and one had
performed security-compliance audits for organisations. This en-
abled us to refine the phrasing and structure of the survey, and the
clarity of the interface.
2.3 Interviews
Interviews took place face-to-face or over the phone, to suit the
needs of participants. Each was audio-recorded and lasted approxi-
mately 30 minutes.
The interviews were guided by a set of questions through which
we aimed to explore the concepts of the online survey in greater
depth. Participants were guided towards a discussion of real-world
security practice and their perceptions of risk-control deployment
in organisations, and the effectiveness of these controls; the full list
of questions is presented in Appendix A. At the end of each session,
participants were given the opportunity to make any additional
comments.
The first set of guiding questions focused on security-control
deployment: the ways in which decisions are made on control de-
ployment and configuration, resources used to guide these decisions,
the impact of broader considerations such as the interconnection
of assets and aggregation of harms on these decisions, and percep-
tions of the most important security controls. This was followed
by questions on security-control effectiveness: perceptions of the
concept, methods of determining control effectiveness and data
required for this, and methods of determining the residual risk of
an organisation. We finished with a set of questions on perceptions
of and the treatment of interdependencies between controls, and
the ways in which these may impact on usage and effectiveness.
2.4 Analysis
Given discrepancy in the community as to how to treat Likert-scale
data [14, 23], we analysed the survey responses by calculating the
mode and median rating, and a comparison of non-neutral scores
(CNNS), which takes the ratio of scores less than, versus greater
than, “neutral". We present all three measures, which support the
same conclusions.
We manually transcribed our interview recordings, producing
transcripts for each discussion. After becoming familiarised with
the data, the researchers coded it using Template Analysis [16].
This is a qualitative data-analysis technique that begins with coding
according to a-priori themes (in this case, the interview questions).
The codebook then evolves iteratively, with relevant sections of
data that do not fit these existing themes being assigned new codes.
We thus produced a template of codes, developed through iterative
application to the dataset. We interpreted and documented the
findings within the themes of the resulting template, engaging in
frequent reflections to avoid bias and the influence of personal
beliefs.
3 SURVEY RESULTS
Table 1 shows the demographics of participants in the online sur-
vey: twelve executive-level cybersecurity professionals, four IT
Directors, and a range of security professionals working internally
(security analysts, engineers and officers) and externally (security
consultants and penetration testers). All participants had at least
three years’ experience (and a majority more than ten) working in
the field of cybersecurity.
Figure 1(a) shows the responses made by participants when they
were asked to rate the effectiveness of the 20 CIS CSCs. A majority
of participants viewed all controls as being either “effective" or
“very effective". The mode and median averages, and the CNNS are
presented in Table 2, and it is clear from the strongly positive CNNS
ratios that there was a high level of agreement between participants
in rating all controls either “effective" or “very effective".
Figure 2 shows the CSCs that were considered “most" and “least"
effective, respectively, by participants. The controls perceived to
be “most effective" by the greatest number of participants were
CSC3 “Vulnerability assessment”, perceived to be “most effective"
by seven participants, CSC4 “Admin privileges”, perceived to be
“most effective" by seven participants, and CSC19 “Incident response”,
perceived to be “most effective" by six participants. While this
provides some indication of agreement, none of these numbers
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Table 1: Online survey participant demographics
Control Effectiveness Control Deployment
Control Description Mode Median CNNS Mode Median CNNS
CSC1 “Device inventories” effective effective 2:18 neutral neutral 12:8
CSC2 “Software inventories” effective effective 2:17 almost never neutral 12:7
CSC3 “Vulnerability assessment” effective effective 2:24 rarely rarely 15:5
CSC4 “Admin privileges” v. effective v. effective 0:28 often neutral 8:12
CSC5 “Secure hosts” effective effective 0:27 often often 8:14
CSC6 “Log monitoring” effective effective 1:20 rarely neutral 13:6
CSC7 “Web and email defence” effective effective 1:21 often often 5:14
CSC8 “Malware defences” effective effective 2:18 almost always almost always 0:24
CSC9 “Protocol controls” effective effective 1:21 neutral, often neutral 10:9
CSC10 “Data recovery” effective effective 1:21 often neutral 9:11
CSC11 “Secure network devices” effective effective 1:26 often often 5:18
CSC12 “Boundary defences” effective effective 5:19 almost always often 2:20
CSC13 “Data protection” effective effective 2:21 rarely, neutral neutral 11:7
CSC14 “Access control” effective effective 2:23 rarely neutral 14:8
CSC15 “Wireless access control” effective effective 3:18 neutral neutral 4:13
CSC16 “Account monitoring” effective effective 0:20 neutral neutral 10:7
CSC17 “Skills and training” effective effective 1:19 often neutral 7:12
CSC18 “Application security” effective effective 3:19 rarely rarely 15:7
CSC19 “Incident response” effective effective 0:26 rarely rarely 15:7
CSC20 “Penetration testing” effective effective 3:22 often neutral 13:8
Table 2: Likert Scale Results: Control Effectiveness and Deployment. CNNS denotes Comparison of Non-Neutral Scores. Pro-
vided descriptions are shorthands to enable ease of reference. For full descriptions, see SANS 20 Critical Security Controls
[11].
represent a particularly large proportion of the 30 respondents, and
it is apparent that the question divided opinion.
The controls perceived to be “least effective" were not clearly
differentiated: although CSC12 “Boundary defences” was rated “least
effective" by the greatest number of participants (five), many others
were selected three or four times, and the margin is small. Opinions
on this question were too divided to allow us to draw reasonable
conclusions.
Figure 1(b) shows the responses made by participants when
they were asked to rate how commonly each of the 20 CIS CSCs is
deployed by organisations. It is clear that there was greater differ-
ence in opinion between participants on this question than on the
previously-presented “effectiveness" question: most of the CSCs
obtained a set of different responses covering the full range of the
Likert scale. As is made clear by the mode average ratings given to
each CSC, presented in Figure 3, there was also greater variation
in the average perception of how commonly each control is de-
ployed by organisations (with modes ranging from “almost never"
for some controls to “almost always" for others) than in the average
perception of how “effective" the control is (as shown, the average
was “effective" or higher across controls).
The mode, median and CNNS of the Likert-scale ratings recorded
by participants are presented in Table 2. Despite the variation in
opinion between participants as a whole, we can observe some areas
of agreement using these statistics. Some controls were considered
to be deployed “often" or “almost always" on average (mode and me-
dian) with highly positive CNNS: CSC8 “Malware defences” ; CSC12
“Boundary defences” ; CSC7 “Web and email defence” ; and CSC11
“Secure network devices”. CSC5 “Secure hosts” was also considered
to be deployed “often" on average (mode and median), although
the fact that the CNNS is closer to an equilibrium indicates that
this view was held less consistently. It is worth noting that the
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Figure 1: Likert responses regarding the effectiveness and deployment of controls
Figure 2: Count of “Most Effective" and “Least Effective"
bucket placements
only control for which the CNNS indicates that the view that it is
deployed “often" or “almost always" was expressed unanimously is
CSC8 “Malware defences”.
Some controls were considered to be deployed “rarely" or “almost
never" on average (mode and median), with highly negative CNNS:
CSC3 “Vulnerability assessment” ; CSC18 “Application security” ; and
CSC19 “Incident response”.
When the CSC effectiveness responses of each participant were
correlated against that participant’s deployment response for the
same control, a weak negative correlation was found. This could
indicate that participants felt that more effective controls were less
likely to be deployed. Alternatively, there may be a “holy grail"
effect in which practitioners expect controls to be more effective
when they have less experience of them (and therefore possibly of
their failings). While it is not possible to present confident conclu-
sions from this correlation, the lack of a strong correlation gives
at least some indication that practitioners’ choices of controls to
deploy may not be directly tied to their perception of their effective-
ness. This correlation was reinforced by analysis of participants’
choices of “most effective” and “least effective” controls, which
indicated a similar weak negative correlation between perceived
control effectiveness and perceived deployment frequency.
4 QUALITATIVE PERSPECTIVES
We present participants’ views on control effectiveness and de-
ployment: their additional comments in the online survey (labelled
PS1—PS30); and responses during the interviews (PI1—PI7).
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Figure 3: Modal responses to CSC deployment
4.1 Control effectiveness
Participants communicated their understanding of the concept
of control effectiveness. Controls may be considered effective if
they reduce an organisation’s vulnerability to being “as low as
practical" (scepticism was expressed at the idea of the complete
effectiveness of any control). This may mean assessing vulnerability
levels relative to other organisations: “if you’re more attractive than
the person next door, you’re more likely to have a burglary" (PI1).
A number of technical controls (including firewalls, encryption
of data, and up-to-date anti-malware systems) and procedural con-
trols (training and awareness of users, data-backup procedures,
network- and endpoint-monitoring capability and patching pro-
cesses) were widely perceived to be fundamental to security in all
organisations. Control effectiveness is context-specific: a control’s
effectiveness depends on numerous factors and has a propensity to
vary over time: “you may have 100% control when you put it in, but
you almost certainly won’t in 1 month’s/6 months’ time" (PI1).
Controls can vary in their effectiveness at protecting different
assets (network-boundary defences may protect servers more ef-
fectively than clients, for example). In assessing the effectiveness
of controls, potential attacker objectives are an important consider-
ation: an attacker aiming to exfiltrate data and an attacker wanting
to “cause the biggest disruption possible" might face very different
challenges in trying to circumvent security controls. The threat
actor being defended against also has an impact: “anti-malware is
effective against ‘mass-market’ attacks but won’t help you much if
you’re defending against nation states" (PS10)
The effectiveness of a control depends on the make and model
used, since weaknesses may exist in controls from certain vendors.
Considering the quality of a control’s implementation is critical to
assessing its effectiveness: A measure can be effective, and in theory
it gets implemented, but the way it gets implemented... is ineffective.
Examples: logs get logged but not looked into; admin access restrictions
applied but access rights ‘creep up’ as the employee moves across the
organisation" (PS17).
A participant noted potential influences on their perceptions: “I
seem to have listed the easier to implement controls as most effective,
and the harder ones as least effective... this is probably insightful to
the effectiveness of these controls in a real-world environment" (PS19).
This variety of influencing factors means measuring the effec-
tiveness of controls is complex. A possible approach is to use threat-
detection platforms to measure the amount of malicious activity
penetrating an organisation’s systems (and the time taken to de-
tection and mitigation) and thus draw conclusions on the effec-
tiveness of the control setup. Formal third-party assessments (e.g.,
penetration tests) are another approach. Assessments of control
effectiveness should account for the importance of assets to the
organisation: “has anything ever been able to get at the things that
you most value in your organisation?" (PI1).
The effectiveness of controls can also be considered in terms of
an organisation’s confidentiality, integrity and availability aims.
Integrity was considered to be particularly difficult to measure,
especially if insiders to the organisation are involved in an attack:
“if they have the authorisation to alter it... it’s virtually impossible to
know whether they’ve particularly done something to the integrity of
the system" (PI1). Availability, on the other hand, can be measured
using metrics such as the amount of network downtime.
Even after the deployment of controls, residual risk remains.
This can be measured using risk-assessment templates, which may
include assessments of the likelihood and impact of a harmful event
occurring. It is the likelihood that an organisation has “the most
chance of influencing" through the deployment of security controls,
while “the impact probably stays much the same, unless your business
changes or the world changes in some way" (PI1) .
There is “nuance and complex interplay between controls" (PS10).
This poses challenges to directly comparing their individual effec-
tiveness, and interdependency must be taken into account. Asset
inventories, for example, “only yield benefits for an already ma-
ture organisation" (PS10), who can act on the information collected;
while “security awareness is only really effective if you have an in-
cident response capability" to act on reports. In assessing controls,
there is a need to obtain a holistic understanding of the security of
the entire network and the way in which controls work collectively
to protect it:
Very few controls in isolation prevent a particular kind of at-
tack... they are usually reinforced by other controls. My back-
ground is in defensive security; generally speaking when I see
controls failing, either in a simulated exercise or real life, it is
due to a failure of multiple controls (PI3).
Controls can also compensate for each other: boundary defence,
for example, is “one of the quickest controls to deploy and would
offer partial mitigation against a lack of endpoint security (hardening,
anti-malware)" (PS10).
4.2 Control deployment
Participants commented on the ways in which organisations, in
their experience, deploy security controls: selecting the controls to
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be used (often guided by standards) and implementing (configuring
and placing) these controls. The segmentation and blocking of
sensitive assets is handled well by some organisations possessing
highly sensitive data: “for companies that deal with security clearance
work, or government work, that stuff’s locked away really well and
you’d be hard-pushed to get to it" (PI5). In other industries, the
network lacks segmentation, creating security problems: “you can
just gain access anywhere" (PI5).
The decisions made by organisations on the risk controls to be de-
ployed, and the implementation of them, can be driven by standards
and regulations, risk-assessment procedures, professional judge-
ment, and guidance from technical vendors and partners. Standards
may be chosen by organisations based on their priorities, types of
system, and need for tailoring: “a lot of them are rather generic and
you really need to understand what you’re doing. I mean, ISO 27001
isn’t really going to help you unless you know what it is" (PI1).
Regulators mandate the adoption of standards and controls by
organisations in certain sectors: finance and healthcare/pharmacy
were cited as two industries within which compliance requirements
drive companies to have a strong adoption of security controls. The
view was expressed that outside such heavily regulated industries
control adoption is less advanced, and networks tend to lack to
necessary segmentation: “if they are not forced, if they have to do it
by themselves, most of the time they will not put in the effort".
A number of factors influence the selection of controls for deploy-
ment. Companies tend to follow a cost-benefit analysis approach,
investing “to protect the crown jewels, not haphazardly but to the
minimum level required" (PI2). The need to prioritise control setups
that protect the assets they “really do not want people to get at"
(PI1) leads to differences in risk-control usage between industries.
One participant gave examples of observed priorities in the defence
sector:
In the defence and security sector... you’re really most concerned
about the confidentiality of your data, and its integrity... they
probably have been much less concerned than other companies
have usually been about things that would now come under
GDPR... they haven’t got much personal data, but they’ve got
a lot of intellectual property and that’s what they’re concerned
with, and they’ve also got a lot of state secrets (PI1).
In some sectors, the prevalence of legacy systems designed with
little security in mind and with backdoors built in as a “norm" makes
producing effective cybersecurity difficult: “if you’re trying to put
a firewall between a distributed system and an old legacy system...
you practically always come a cropper" (PI1). Finance was cited
as a sector in which this problem has been commonplace, with
transactions systems run on Windows XP, and which has seen
improvements in recent years. The prevalence of legacy systems
in the healthcare sector was also highlighted, particularly in the
context of their vulnerability to ransomware.
The type of systems (e.g., information versus operational tech-
nologies) being run by an organisation impacts hugely on the de-
ployment of controls: “whether it’s potentially a standalone system,
or a safety-critical system, or an aircraft... it’s going to really dra-
matically change what controls we pick" (PI2). The security of an
organisation’s network is impacted by its size: “the larger the net-
work the harder it becomes to apply your controls" (PI5). On the other
hand, large organisations in certain sectors may be more advanced
in their adoption of controls than SMEs due to the capability of
their dedicated security teams:
The answer depends largely on the sector you are talking about
and the size of the company. SMEs seldom deploy many of the
controls other than having some anti-virus software, probably
patching and maybe a firewall, but large companies in sectors
like finance or defence and aerospace deploy almost all of them
and it depends how robust and good their implementation is
and the products they select (PS9).
Smaller companies often outsource the security of their systems
to the cloud, which can shift responsibility for deploying controls to
service providers. In the private sector, financial risk is an important
driver for control deployment: “a lot of it comes down to how they
convince their shareholders that they’re making an adequate risk
cost-benefit analysis" (PI2).
5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
5.1 Factors affecting control effectiveness and
adoption
We have obtained an account of the range of factors that can impact
on the effectiveness of a control, and established characteristics
of an organisation that can affect the way in which they deploy
controls. Both are summarised below.
Control effectiveness.
• A control’s implementation – the quality of the product
used, its initial configuration, and its treatment over time
(updating and adaptation in line with changing networks
and threats) – impact on its effectiveness.
• The capabilities and motivations of the threat actors a
control defends against impact on its effectiveness.
• The assets a control defends must be considered when rea-
soning about its effectiveness.
• Thewider organisational context also has an impact: the
business use-cases of the network, and the size of the net-
work and organisation.
• The interactions and interdependencies between con-
trols impact on their effectiveness. There is a need to take
a holistic view of controls, as controls depend on others,
compensate for others, and work in combination.
Control deployment.
• Organisations prioritise the protection of their “crown
jewels", and controls are often deployed with a focus on this
protection.
• The sensitivity of the assets handled by an organisation can
impact on its deployment of controls: companies handling
highly sensitive data may be more likely to have segmented
their networks effectively, for example.
• Sector can impact on priorities and therefore on control
deployment:
– Organisations in the defence and security sector are likely
to be most concerned with preserving the confidentiality
of data.
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– In the private sector reliance on the approval of stakehold-
ers makes financial risk a key driver in the adoption of
controls.
– Regulation drives the deployment of controls in certain
sectors, and in organisations that carry out certain types
of business.
– Finance and defence were cited multiple times as sectors in
which control deployment was more advanced in general.
• The existing infrastructure of an organisation may im-
pact on its control deployment: securing legacy versus more
recent systems, for example.
• The existing security maturity of an organisation may in-
fluence its selection of cybersecurity standards, as more ma-
ture organisations are more likely to adopt more advanced
standards (ISO 27001, for example).
• The size of an organisation may impact on their control
deployment. SMEs are less likely to have deployed controls
as thoroughly as larger enterprises in general, and would
begin with basics such as anti-virus software, patching and
firewalls (and may outsource systems and security to cloud
providers).
5.2 Trends in control effectiveness and
adoption
Despite the range of factors impacting on control effectiveness,
our results suggest that some controls are perceived to be more
effective than others in general. For instance, the survey showed
that CSC3 “Vulnerability assessment”, CSC4 “Admin privileges”, and
CSC19 “Incident response” were perceived to fall into the top 3
“most effective" controls by the most participants (although it is
important to note that the margin was not large, and other controls
were considered “most effective" by other participants).
We were unable to draw reasonable conclusions on the “least
effective" controls due to a lack of consistency in responses across
participants; this may suggest that participants found difficulty in
reasoning about “least effective" controls due to a belief that all are
“effective" (indeed, all controls were rated as being “effective" or
higher). These facts appear to be in contradiction with the multitude
of descriptions throughout the studies of control failures that had
led to security events; we posit that perhaps the “ideal" version of
all of these controls is considered “effective"; however in reality this
ideal version is rarely deployed.
Trends emerged from the online survey suggesting that certain
controls are deployed more commonly across organisations. The
controls considered to be commonly deployed were: CSC8 “Mal-
ware defences”, CSC12 “Boundary defences”, CSC7 “Web and email
defence” and CSC11 “Secure network devices”. Other controls were
considered to be deployed infrequently in general: CSC3 “Vulnera-
bility assessment”, CSC18 “Application security” and CSC19 “Incident
response”.
5.3 Interpreting the findings in light of related
work
Considering these findings alongside the results of various related
work (as described in Section 1) that has explored the questions
of control effectiveness and deployment is important to support
drawing reliable conclusions and understanding additional relevant
context.
Such et. al. [25], for example, presented a set of cost-effectiveness
measurements for a range of assurance techniques. Where there
is overlap between the control sets explored (which is the case in
many of the controls for security-testing of systems, configuration
and code, although Such et. al. did not consider controls for inci-
dent response, operational monitoring or training), we can observe
similarities between these results and ours – for example, in their
finding that vulnerability scans were perceived to be one of the
most cost-effective controls. This work also helps to provide addi-
tional context for some of the results of our study – e.g., considering
whether and how perceptions of the cost of controls, and the time
and expertise required to deploy them, might (even subconsciously)
have influenced responses to our study. Other work such as [15],
which explored the prioritisation of the ISO 27001 controls in a spe-
cific organisation scenario using fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process,
and [9], which used model optimisation to identify cost-effective
CIS controls for specific scenarios and threats), can provide similar
support and context.
The work of Dietrich et. al. [7], who investigated system oper-
ators’ perspectives on common security misconfigurations, also
provides valuable support for the interpretation of our results on
control effectiveness and deployment. Dietrich et. al. presented find-
ings on misconfigurations that commonly occur in the deployment
of security controls (for example, faulty firewall settings, use of bad
or default passwords, and faulty assignment of access privileges)
– which provides additional context relating to the deployment
of these controls (and indeed, perceptions of such common mis-
configurations may have influenced respondents’ perceptions of a
control’s overall effectiveness or deployment in our study).
5.4 Relevance of findings to stakeholders
We anticipate that these results will be beneficial to a range of
parties from both academia and industry. For researchers seeking
to reason about and measure organisational cybersecurity risk,
insight into the collective knowledge and perceptions of the security
practitioners who observe and address these risks on a day-to-day
basis will help to refine understanding of the use of cybersecurity
controls and their real value inmitigating risk. This in turn is critical
for supporting research in a range of areas including the refinement
of cyber-insurance models and the development of approaches
to improving organisational cybersecurity posture, and will help
to ensure that such research is aligned with the current industry
practice.
As we have noted, determining prioritisation of the deployment
of risk controls and determining their likely impact on overall
cybersecurity posture is a challenging task, and the collective views
of the expert community are a valuable resource on this topic. We
envisage that our results on overall effectiveness will be useful to
organisations making decisions on the implementation of controls,
and that the identification of the factors impacting effectiveness and
deployment can highlight the considerations that may influence
these decisions.
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The perspectives of security practitioners on this topic also have
implications for the providers of cybersecurity standards and guid-
ance. We might assume that these sources recommend those con-
trols considered most important to maintaining security, and there-
fore provide an indication of effectiveness. We might also assume
that organisations follow key standards, implementing those con-
trols they recommend, and that these sources therefore provide an
indication of deployment.
In an examination of six key industry standards (the CIS 20
CSCs [11], NIST Cybersecurity Framework [21], ISO 27002 [1],
GCHQ 10 Steps to Cybersecurity [4], Cyber Essentials [5], and CO-
BIT 5 [13]), we found frequent reference to our “most effective"
controls (CSCs 3 and 4 are referred to in all, and CSC 19 in five of the
six, standards), and all four controls that obtained highest deploy-
ment frequency are referenced across all six standards. This implies
that these standards are recommending those controls perceived to
be most effective by practitioners, and that they play a key role in
guiding the adoption of controls by organisations. It is important to
note that the recommendations made in these standards are usually
updated over time, to reflect perceived changes in the importance
of various risk controls and practices.
Finally, we suggest that these results are valuable to the cyber-
insurance community. A refined understanding of control effec-
tiveness could inform pre-screening forms, enable more accurate
calculation of insurance provisions for an organisation based on the
residual risk they face having deployed controls, and inform guid-
ance given by the insurance industry on risk-control products [19].
In calculations of residual risk for organisations in which data on
the deployment of controls is lacking, assumptions might be made
about the likelihood that controls are in place based on results such
as these on control-deployment frequency. Risk modelling must
take into account the identified influencing factors, for example
the implementation of a control and the organisational context.
Understanding which controls organisations deploy, and the ways
in which they deploy them, allows us to understand the likely ef-
fectiveness of these controls more accurately (and this argument is
bolstered by the emphasis placed on control implementation as a
factor affecting control effectiveness by participants in the studies).
A comparison of the controls most frequently referenced in 24
insurance forms offered by insurers based in the UK and US [26, 28]
with our results showed that our “most effective" controls were
referenced relatively little (CSC3 especially). Of the controls that
we found to be deployed most frequently, CSC8 and CSC12 are
referenced across a large number of these forms, while CSC7 and
CSC11 are not. It would be valuable to further explore discrep-
ancies between data collection by the insurance community, key
standards and guidelines, and the perceptions of the practitioner
community, and this may highlight key controls that are currently
not adequately considered in insurance pre-screening processes.
5.5 Limitations
It is important that the limitations of the methodology are taken
into account in the interpretation of the results. Owing to the nature
of our qualitative data collection there was variation in the level
of detail in which different participants discussed each question.
Furthermore, this paper can report only those factors that emerged
through this data collection; it is possible that others would emerge
in surveying and conversing with other participants. While our re-
sults represent the views of a range of experts in the field, therefore,
they are not necessarily exhaustive, and further studies would be
valuable in verifying and consolidating these findings. Nevertheless,
this is only the first attempt in using this methodology to assess
security controls effectiveness and deployment.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
The effectiveness and deployment of controls varies across different
organisational contexts, affected by the characteristics and prior-
ities of organisations, the way in which they configure controls
and the threats they face, amongst other factors. We propose a new
methodology to explore practitioners’ perspectives on the effective-
ness of controls in reducing organisational risk (RQ1) and on the
deployment of these controls by organisations (RQ2). We conduct
the first attempt to use this methodology with a set of research
studies.
Our results showed that certain controls (including vulnera-
bility remediation, administrative-privilege control, and incident-
response capability) were considered more effective than others,
and that there is variation in the frequency with which controls
are deployed (with malware defences and boundary defences be-
ing deployed often by organisations). Some controls are reliant on
others, and interdependencies between controls impact on their ef-
fectiveness but are not necessarily considered systematically during
deployment.
Since cyber-risk and cybersecurity practice are fast-changing,
findings on control effectiveness and adoption may vary over time.
If methodologies such as these are used to collect data (that may
influence practice and guidance), it is important that the lifetime for
which the data remains relevant is considered. It would be valuable
to repeat follow-up studies at regular time intervals, to capture
changes in perceptions over time.
In order to understand the validity of both commonly held and
differing beliefs, it is important to further comprehend their ba-
sis. Therefore, we would recommend that future research seeks
to understand the preconceptions that underpin these views, in-
cluding the possible influence of widely-held misconceptions and
past experience. Moreover, our research has showed that practition-
ers are aware of information that is not reflected in the standards.
The community may, therefore, be benefitting from shared and
tacit knowledge that helps to improve cybersecurity, but is not
formalised or documented fully. Codifying this knowledge will
not only help promote best practice, but could also lead to more
accurate quantification of risk exposure.
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(1) How would you make decisions on which security controls
to apply to assets?
(2) How would you make decisions on how to apply these secu-
rity controls? I.e., their placement and configuration.
(3) How would you decide what security standards/framework
to adopt in an organisation?
(4) To what extent are connected assets and aggregate (sec-
ondary, tertiary) harms considered in control selection?
(5) What would you say are the three most important security
controls today? Why? What do they protect against?
Security control effectiveness
(1) What would you consider the “effectiveness" of security
controls to mean?
(2) How would you determine the effectiveness of security con-
trols? What factors contribute to a control’s effectiveness?
(3) What are the types of ways in which organizations can mea-
sure a control’s effectiveness? What metrics do you consider
relevant?
(4) What are some of the types of data that would need to be
collected to measure control effectiveness?
(5) Residual risk is the risk remaining after a risk mitigation
measure has been applied – do you agree with this descrip-
tion?
(6) Do you seek to measure or determine the levels of residual
risk? If so, how? What metrics do you consider relevant?
Control dependencies
(1) How do you regard and treat risk controls as dependent upon
each other?
(2) To what extent do organisations have a good understanding
about the interdependencies between risk controls?
(3) How would you go about identifying and understanding the
interdependencies between risk controls?
(4) Are there are any interdependencies that you consider risky
and monitor accordingly?
(5) How does the effectiveness of controls impact the interde-
pendencies between controls?
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